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Most existing work on the price elasticity of demand for health insurance focuses on employees’ decisions
to enroll in employer-provided plans. Yet any attempt to achieve universal coverage must focus on
the uninsured, the vast majority of whom are not offered employer-sponsored insurance. In the summer
of 2008, we conducted a survey experiment to assess the willingness to pay for a health plan among
a large sample of uninsured Americans. The experiment yields price elasticities substantially greater
than those found in most previous studies. We use these results to estimate coverage expansion under
the Affordable Care Act, with and without an individual mandate. We estimate that 39 million uninsured
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Expanding coverage to the roughly 50 million Americans who lack health insurance has
long been a key public policy concern, and one that has received enormous attention in
recent years.1 Most notably, the Aordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) attempts to cover these
individuals via a combination of a large expansion of Medicaid and subsidies to purchase
private insurance on state-run health insurance exchanges.2
Relying on existing research to predict the eects of such a fundamental reform on the
currently uninsured is problematic, because existing work generally focuses on the decision
to enroll in employer-sponsored health insurance. Of course, there is a good reason for this
focus: employers are, after all, the source of insurance for a majority of the non-elderly pop-
ulation. However, the currently uninsured are rarely oered the opportunity to purchase
insurance through an employer (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004), calling into question the
utility of existing estimates for understanding insurance demand of this population. Not
only are these individuals substantially poorer than the average worker oered employer
insurance, but the decision to, say, purchase subsidized insurance from a state exchange
might fundamentally dier from the decision to enroll in an employer-sponsored health
plan, which takes place in the context of co-workers, an employer and potentially bene-
ts counselors. The same questions of generalizability arise for existing work on adverse
selection, most of which relies on employee take-up decisions.
To address these concerns, we devised survey questions specically designed to elicit
the expressed willingness to pay among the uninsured for a comprehensive health plan.
Existing data on the uninsured are generally limited in part because many respondents
must be screened in order to yield a sample of uninsured people large enough to generate
precise estimates, given that over 80 percent of Americans are covered by some form of
1See http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf for the most recent estimates of
the number of uninsured Americans.
2The Kaiser Family Foundation summarizes the Act at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/
upload/8061.pdf.
2health insurance. Fortunately, for a two-week period during the summer of 2008, the Gallup
Poll included our questions in their ongoing survey of 1,000 individuals a day. We asked
respondents whether they would purchase a comprehensive health plan for a given monthly
premium, and then lowered the price in several stages for those who initially said they would
not purchase it. To the best of our knowledge, our dataset is the rst to elicit self-reported
willingness-to-pay for health insurance among a large sample of uninsured Americans.
Our results suggest that subsidizing the purchase of insurance plans would signicantly
reduce the population of the uninsured. For example, we estimate that about sixty percent
of the uninsured would voluntarily enroll for an annual premium of $2,000. Under the cur-
rent specication of subsidies in the ACA, we estimate that over 75 percent of uninsured
adults would enroll, implying that some 39 million uninsured individuals would gain cov-
erage as a result of the law. We also estimate that stripping the individual mandate from
the law|the constitutionality of which is being challenged in federal court|would lead to
between 7 and 12 million fewer individuals gaining coverage.
The Gallup data included extensive information on health status, and thus allow us to
gauge the extent of adverse selection for a given subsidy schedule. We nd, consistent with
past literature, that less healthy individuals have lower price elasticities.3 However, when
we calculate the prices individuals would actually face under the ACA subsidy schedule,
we nd no evidence that less healthy individuals would be more likely to enroll, with or
without a mandate. As enrollment is a function of both elasticities and the price points
individuals face, we caution that other subsidy schedules may well lead to adverse selection,
and indeed Chandra et al. (2011) nd that the individual mandate was important in limiting
adverse selection under Massachusetts' 2006 health reform, which, as we discuss, mirrors
the ACA is important respects. With or without a mandate, we nd no evidence that those
predicted to take-up private insurance are less healthy than those who are already privately
insured, suggesting premiums for the latter group should not increase due to a change in
3See, for example, Strombom et al. (2002), who nd that older and sicker individuals appear
less sensitive to premium price in their decisions among dierent health plans.
3the composition of the private insurance pool.
We calculate elasticities of take-up with respect to premium price of around one, sig-
nicantly larger than those from past work. There are several possible explanations for
this dierence. First, as mentioned earlier, almost all past work is based on individuals'
decisions to join employer-provided health plans. Moreover, past studies generally suer
from: (1) the need to impute prices for those who do not have health insurance or cannot
recall their premium price; (2) the existence of a wide variety of health plans with dierent
features rather than a homogeneous plan.
Our sampling frame allows us to gather a large group of uninsured individuals in order
to directly elicit their willingness to pay for health insurance. Moreover, our survey design
allows us to focus on a specic insurance product and to vary its price exogenously. Overall,
our results suggest that applying the elasticities in past work may seriously under-estimate
the eect of policies to extend coverage to the uninsured. Indeed, we estimate higher take-up
rates under the provisions of the ACA than does the Congressional Budget Oce.
Of course, using survey data on people's self-reported decisions in hypothetical situ-
ations presents serious concerns, such as anchoring bias (the tendency of individuals to
choose a valuation close to the rst price the survey suggests). We make an eort to ad-
dress these concerns by randomly varying the initial prices we oer respondents and nd
no signicant eect of the initial oer on respondents' nal valuation. Moreover, our survey
diers from contingent valuation studies, which typically ask respondents to value a public
good, such as an environmental project, with which they have little personal experience.
We instead ask about a private good that most people would have experience with: given
the well-documented \churning" in health-insurance status (see, e.g., Klein et al. 2005),
many uninsured individuals would have been insured in the recent past. However, other
potential biases related to hypothetical valuation are more dicult to address and we later
discuss how they might aect our estimates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews past work on the
4price elasticity of health insurance. Section 3 describes the Gallup Daily Poll as well as the
questions we added to it. Section 4 presents data analysis on uninsured individuals' decisions
to buy into a subsidized health plan, estimating aggregate price elasticities, predicting
individual reservation prices, and testing for the presence of adverse selection. Section 5
uses the results in the previous sections to estimate the eects of the Aordable Care Act.
Section 6 oers concluding remarks.
2 Review of Related Literature
At least three strands of research speak to the potential eects of subsidizing the purchase
of health insurance for the uninsured. First, many papers have attempted to estimate
the price elasticity of health insurance demand, with the majority of work focusing on
employees' decisions to join health plans oered by their employers. Second, other papers
have examined take-up rates among those eligible for past expansions of government health
programs such as Medicaid. Finally, we review the experience in Massachusetts, which in
2006 implemented a health insurance reform very similar to the Aordable Care Act.
2.1 Estimating the price elasticity of health insurance demand
In general, existing work examines either rm-level data and estimates the share of workers
who take up insurance as a function of the premium prices of the plans a rm oers, or
individual-level data and estimates take-up decisions as a function of reported or imputed
premium prices. Papers in this area typically face several common challenges in estimating
the price elasticity of demand for this population.
First, noisy price imputation will lead to measurement error, generally biasing elasticity
estimates toward zero. This concern is especially acute with individual-level data, as those
who chose not to enroll in a health plan are unlikely to perfectly remember the premium
price they were oered. Second, elasticity estimates implicitly assume a homogenous insur-
ance product, when in fact individuals that pay higher premiums may be obtaining more
generous health care benets, again biasing elasticities toward zero.
5Even if researchers are able to surmount these challenges, applying their results to the
population of uninsured individuals is problematic. Most studies analyze the decision of
employees to take-up health plans provided by their employers, and thus it is unclear how
these elasticities relate to the uninsured population, of whom less then fteen percent have
access to employer-provided insurance.4
Some key papers have sought to address these problems. In a rm-level analysis, Cutler
(2003) estimates the share of workers who take-up employer-provided insurance as a func-
tion of premium price. He uses the price of the cheapest plan oered, arguing that doing
so lessens worries about the premium price being a direct function of employee decisions
(relative to, say, using the average price of the plans employees chose). He nds elasticities
ranging from -0.03 to -0.1, similar to results in Chernew et al. (1997) and Blumberg et al.
(2001).
Gruber and Washington (2005) use the introduction of pre-tax payment of premiums for
postal workers (and, later, all federal workers) as a source of plausibly exogenous variation
in eective premium price. They nd almost no eect of price on take-up (an implied
elasticity of -0.007) but substantial evidence that the subsidy led employees to choose more
expensive plans. They note that expanding coverage was never the goal of the policy change
(the hope was to make federal jobs more competitive with those in the public sector). Thus,
knowledge of the eective price change among uninsured federal workers may have been
limited.
Gruber and Poterba (1994) examine the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which for the rst
time allowed the self-employed to deduct the cost of their health-insurance premiums. As
the benet of a deduction depends on an individual's federal income tax rate, the reform
4In our data, 65 percent of the uninsured are employed (see Table 1). According to Kaiser
Family Foundation (2004), among uninsured workers, only twenty percent were oered employer
insurance and turned it down, with another twenty percent working in rms that oer insurance
to some workers but are themselves ineligible and the rest working in rms that do not oer
insurance at all). We thus estimate that 0:65:20 = 13 percent of uninsured adults in our sample
turned down an oer of employer insurance.
6generated dierential eective price changes among the self-employed. Their dierence-in-
dierence estimation suggests an elasticity of about -1.8. Their study is especially relevant
for two reasons. First, the authors estimate far greater elasticities than papers examining
employee take-up of employer-provided plans. Second, the self-employed may be a good
analogue for the uninsured in that both groups would make their health insurance decisions
largely independent from the inuence of employers or fellow employees. However, the
preferences, constraints, and resources of the uninsured may not mirror those of the self-
employed.
2.2 Medicaid take-up literature
A second set of papers examines why take-up rates of free government health insurance
have been so low. Currie and Gruber (1996) study the expansion of Medicaid coverage
in the 1980s and 1990s and nd that only about a third of pregnant women eligible for
Medicaid actually enroll. Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004), exploiting sharp age cut-os
that determined eligibility under the Medicaid expansions, nd even lower rates of take-up.
Low take-up rates among those eligible for Medicaid (which requires no out-of-pocket
costs and oers more generous benets than almost any employer plan) suggests a very
limited capacity of even a heavily subsidized plan to extend coverage to the uninsured.
However, there are a number of reasons why these estimates may not predict enrollment
rates in a setting such as the ACA.
First, the results themselves may be underestimates of the true Medicaid take-up rate
as researchers may have only noisy proxies for true Medicaid eligibility. As Remler and
Glied (2003) note, programs with asset tests often appear to have low take-up rates in
part because individuals who appear eligible to the researcher|who often only has data
on individuals' income levels|are not in fact eligible. While many states have recently
ended Medicaid asset tests for children, most have kept them in place for parents and other
adults (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009), which may explain the apparent low take-up
rates of adults documented by Sommers and Epstein (2010) and others. Daponte et al.
7(1999) nd that proxying eligibility with whether an individual meets the income test
substantially decreases estimated take-up rates in the food stamp program: only about half
of a sample of poor households whose income made them eligible for the program met the
other requirements in the state of Pennsylvania.
Second, many people covered by the Medicaid expansions studied in the past literature
already had other sources of coverage. Currie and Gruber estimate that 66 percent of
individuals made eligible between 1987 and 1992 already had private insurance. Although
Medicaid is free, there is signicant paperwork associated with proving eligibility and some
doctors are reluctant to treat Medicaid patients because of lower reimbursement rates.
Thus, privately insured individuals may be hesitant to switch despite the potential cost
savings. In order to address the problem that pre-existing private insurance coverage would
mask the true demand for a government-subsidized insurance product, we estimate price
elasticities on a large sample of uninsured individuals.
Finally, many individuals may not understand their Medicaid eligibility. Indeed, current
Medicaid eligibility rules are quite complicated: they vary by state, and within state usually
vary depending on age and household composition. Aizer (2007) nds that informational
barriers are an important reason for low take-up rates, especially among Hispanics and
Asians. The implementation of a national reform with uniform subsidies might overcome
some of these barriers. Notably, the ACA eliminates asset tests for Medicaid and makes
eligibility a function only of income. Moreover, a plan with an individual mandate could
encourage individuals to learn all their insurance options once they discover they otherwise
must pay a nancial penalty.
2.3 Take-up of subsidized insurance by the uninsured in Massachusetts
Perhaps a more direct way of estimating take-up of subsidized insurance at the national
level is to examine the experience of Massachusetts, which in 2006 implemented a health
reform very similar to the ACA. Estimates of take-up vary somewhat, but all suggest that
reform has essentially eliminated uninsurance in the state.
8The state itself reports that the uninsured share of non-elderly adults|the population
represented our Gallup sample|fell from thirteen to four percent in the rst two years of
the reform. The Kaiser Family Foundation reports that in the rst three years two-thirds
of the total uninsured population gained insurance. The state's most current estimates
indicate that only 2.7 percent of residents remained uninsured in 2009, even in the midst
of the severe recession.5
While the 2006 Massachusetts reform and the Aordable Care Act are similar, Mas-
sachusetts is not representative of the country as a whole in important respects. Notably,
the year before the reform, only two states (Minnesota and Wisconsin) had a lower per-
centage of uninsured residents. Similarly, in 2009, only seven states had higher median
household income and no state had a higher share of its residents with at least a bache-
lors degree.6 For these reasons, while Massachusetts serves as an important benchmark, we
focus on gathering data on a nationally representative sample of uninsured Americans.
3 Data
3.1 The Gallup-Healthways Daily Poll
Every day since January 2008, the Gallup Organization has surveyed about 1,000 individu-
als age 18 and older as part of the Gallup-Healthways Daily Poll. The interview takes about
15 minutes, with questions ranging from respondents' preferences in upcoming elections to
their credit history, as well as basic demographic information. Fortunately for our pur-
poses, the survey includes a number of questions on individuals' health conditions, health
behaviors and health insurance coverage.7
5See \Facts and Figures" at https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/
connector/menuitem.d7b34e88a23468a2dbef6f47d7468a0c?fiShown=default for estimates
from the Massachusetts Health Connector, the independent state agency charged with helping
residents comply with the law. Kaiser oers a summary of the state law and its aects so far on
the uninsurance rate at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7777-02.pdf.
6See http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0229.xls.
7A list of the core questions is available at www.well-beingindex.com/
methodology-questions.html.
9Gallup takes several steps to draw a representative sample of the population: they use
dual-frame random-digit-dial sampling that includes cell phones; they follow a random
selection method to choose one respondent within a household; and they provide Spanish-
language interviewers for respondents who speak only Spanish. Gallup also provides sample
weights to compensate for disproportionalities in selection probabilities and non-response,
so that the weighted sample matches the national distribution in terms of age, sex, region,
gender, education and race. We utilize the sample weights in all of our analyses.
3.2 Our additions to the Gallup Survey
Gallup agreed to add to its daily survey several questions we specically designed to elicit
uninsured individuals' willingness to pay for a subsidized private plan. From August 22 to
September 8, 2008, Gallup asked everyone who reported being uninsured (1,332 individuals)
our questions, which took the following general form: \If you could get a health insurance
policy for yourself that is as good as the one that members of Congress have, given your
current nancial situation, would you buy it for $X a year, which works out to $X/12 per
month?"8 As we explain in more detail below, the cost X varied. We randomly assigned
individuals to dierent starting values of $X and then lowered $X if the respondent said
he or she would not purchase the plan.
One concern with data on hypothetical choices is anchoring bias, the tendency of sub-
jects to insuciently adjust their response from an arbitrary starting point (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). For example, anchoring bias would arise if subjects in our survey claimed
they would purchase health insurance at or near the rst price suggested because they inter-
8The phrase \as good as members of Congress receive" was meant to signal the comprehen-
siveness of the health plan in question. Indeed, the Aordable Care Act creates state exchanges
modeled after the Federal Employee Health Benets Plan, which covers members of Congress.
Interviewers were provided the following instructions: \If respondent asks what the health insur-
ance plan is like for members of Congress, read:) Members of Congress can choose from a variety
of health insurance plans. A common choice is Blue Cross/Blue Shield. This insurance requires
co-pays and deductibles similar to those paid by many private sector workers. For example, a
primary doctor visit requires a $20 co-pay; a day in the hospital requires a $100 deductible; par-
ticipants can see a doctor in the preferred provider network; some dental coverage is provided,
but vision care is not covered."
10pret it as signaling the social desirability of health insurance. Alternatively, some subjects
might reject the rst price but upon hearing a second, lower price, accept it so as not to
appear stubborn to the interviewer, even though they privately judge both prices as too
high.
To assess the importance of this problem, we randomly assigned the uninsured subjects
to one of two questionnaires. Questionnaire A started with an annual premium price of
$4,000 and then lowered the price rst to $3,000 for those who said no, and then to $2,000
if respondents said no to $3,000 (though subjects were not told that lower prices would
follow). Questionnaire B started with a price of $3,000 and then followed with a price of
$2,000. Comparing responses across the two questionnaires allows us to test for anchoring
bias, and we report results of these tests in the next section.9
4 Results from the Gallup survey
4.1 Raw survey results
Table 1 presents summary statistics separately for the insured and uninsured subjects in the
sample Gallup collected during our 16-day window (we restrict the sample to individuals
under 65 as this older group is eligible for Medicare). Though we focus on the uninsured
in most of the later analysis, it is useful to consider how these two groups dier across a
variety of measures. In general, the uninsured in our data are younger, more likely to be
male and less likely to be married, consistent with past survey data (see, e.g., Cheong et al.
2007). Their income is less than half that of the insured, and they are less likely to have a
job. Notably, the uninsured are more than twice as likely as the insured to have ever been
denied coverage when trying to purchase health insurance in the past.
Figure 1 shows the share of respondents who say they would enroll in the plan at each
9Gallup randomized within each day of the survey and the randomization appears to have
been successful. The dierences between individuals assigned questionnaire A versus B in the
share female, Black, Hispanic, employed, ever denied health care and the mean age, income and
BMI are all insignicant at the ten percent level, both individually and jointly. Results available
upon request.
11price, plotted separately by which questionnaire they answered. Of those randomly assigned
to Questionnaire A, 26.9 percent said they would purchase the plan if the annual premium
were $4,000 and an additional 11.9 percent said they would once the price was lowered to
$3,000, for a total of 37.9 percent. This share is similar to the 34.6 percent of Questionnaire
B respondents who agreed to purchase the plan at $3,000, even though in their case $3,000
was the rst price presented to them. The two groups diverge more when facing a price
of $2,000, with a take-up rate of 59.5 percent for Questionnaire A respondents and 51.7
percent for Questionnaire B. Overall, however, anchoring bias appears minimal. We more
rigorously test for anchoring bias in the regression analysis.10
We calculate arc elasticities between each pair of (take-up;price) points in Figure 1 by
dividing the percent change in take-up by the percent change in price, where each change
is calculated relative to its mid-point. To avoid cluttering the gure, we generally focus on
those elasticities based on price variation within the same survey treatment as opposed to
comparing across surveys, though include all other elasticities in the notes to the table.
The ve take-up rates generate eight arc elasticities, all clustered closely around 1.0, and
far larger than those found in most past work. Of particular interest is the elasticity estimate
based on the take-up rate at $4,000 from Questionnaire A and $3,000 from Questionnaire B,
the rst prices presented by each of the surveys. If anchoring bias were driving individuals'
responses, then this comparison should yield minimal dierences in take-up and thus a
substantially reduced elasticity, but the resulting elasticity of 0.87 is only slightly below
the elasticities generated from within-questionnaire price variation.
10Our nding of minimal anchoring bias diers from contingent valuation studies, in which
respondents are surveyed about their valuation of public, non-market goods (see Green et al.
1998 for evidence of anchoring bias in contingent valuation surveys). One possible explanation is
that our results are more robust because we asked people to report how they would make decisions
concerning private goods they probably have considered purchasing before, not how much they
would be willing to contribute to support public goods, a decision that they do not encounter
in their everyday lives. Brown et al. (2008) nd that individuals are most consistent and reliable
(i.e., they do not make choices that imply A > B > C > A and that they make the same choice
when the same choice set is presented to them at dierent points during the experiments) when
they are deciding between a private good and a sum of money (the case in our experiment), as
opposed to two private goods or a public good and money.
124.2 Regression results
The Gallup data allow us to estimate the following equation:
Takeupij = Priceij + Xi + "ij: (1)
where individuals are indexed by i, prices by j, Takeupij is an indicator variable for whether
individual i says she would purchase the health plan at price j, Priceij is the premium price
(rescaled so that its coecient represents the percentage-point change in take-up associated
with a $1000 increase in premium price), Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, and
"ij is an error term. We cluster standard errors at the individual level to account for the
fact that each individual has two (Questionnaire B) or three (Questionnaire A) price obser-
vations. We down-weight the latter group so that individuals are not given greater weight
merely because they were randomized into Questionnaire A (though this re-weighting leaves
the results essentially unchanged).11
Col. (1) of Table 2 shows the results from an OLS estimation of this equation without
covariates. The coecient equals -0.152, consistent with the roughly 30-percentage-point
drop in take-up between $2,000 to $4,000 depicted in Figure 1. Cols. (2) and (3) show
that the result is robust to including basic controls|col. (3) includes these controls and
col. (2) re-estimates the col. (1) specication on the col. (3) sample. These results suggest
that price is uncorrelated with our control variables, as would be expected under random
assignment.
Cols. (4) and (5) show that the coecient estimate is robust to using a probit specica-
tion or adding individual xed eects, respectively. Finally, we examine whether including
multiple price observations for each person leads to incorrect inference. While clustering
at the person level should in principle adjust standard errors correctly, we take a more
conservative approach by randomly choosing one price observation per person and then es-
11As noted earlier, all results employ Gallup's sample weights. As such, for these regressions,
the weights are merely scaled by two-thirds for individuals in Questionnaire A.
13timating equation (1) on this smaller (n = 1;184) sample. Repeating this estimation 1000
times yields a mean coecient value of -0.151 with a standard error of 0.021 (implying a
t-statistic greater than seven). Therefore, even after throwing out a signicant amount of
information we nd highly precise point estimates.
Some of the covariates reported in Table 2 are worth noting. Blacks are more likely to
say they would purchase the plan. So are higher-income individuals, not surprising given
that price is in absolute dollars as opposed to a share of individual income. Notably, the
dummy variable indicating that the subject answered Questionnaire A (which initially
oers the chance to purchase the plan at $4,000) is positive. This result is not surprising
given that in Figure 1 take-up rates for Questionnaire A are everywhere to the left of those
for Questionnaire B. However, the coecient does not approach statistical signicance
(p-value > 0:6) and is small in magnitude, suggesting limited anchoring bias.
In Table 3, we report elasticities for several subsamples, based on the xed-eects spec-
ication in col (5) of Table 2. The rst row shows an elasticity for the entire sample around
-1.07, consistent with the arc elasticities in Figure 1. Elasticities across race, gender, and
employment and marital status are quite similar. Older and sicker (as measured by self-
reported health problems and past attempts to purchase insurance) individuals are less
price elastic as are relatively higher-income individuals. The health-status and age results
are consistent with Strombom et al. (2002), and are consistent with this group being unin-
sured not because they have little demand for insurance but because their health costs
mean they are not oered coverage at an aordable price.
4.3 Estimating the demand curve for insurance among the uninsured
The raw data give us an interval (though not always a closed interval) for each person's
reservation price, but we can improve on the accuracy of the reservation price by estimating
an interval regression that conditions on a large set of covaraiates: specically, all the
controls listed in Table 2, as well as a set of ten income dummies, interactions between
sex and race, and dummy variables related to marriage and cohabitation arrangements.
14This regression gives us a vector of estimated coecients with which we can predict each
person's valuation of the insurance product. So as not to discard any information from the
survey, we use the estimates to calculate the expected valuation conditional on it being in
the respondents reported interval.
More formally, we take the coecient vector ^  from the interval regression. Then, for
each person i we take their chosen interval (ai;bi) and calculate E(^ Xi+"i j ai < ^ aXi+"i <
bi). As the interval need not be closed, bi can equal  1 or 1 and the expectation can in
fact be negative, though for less than two percent of observations do we estimate negative
reservation prices.12
Figure 2 shows the demand curve generated from this simple algorithm. We plot price
on the y-axis and the share of individuals whose valuation of the health plan is at least
that price on the x-axis. Not surprisingly, given that we constrain predictions to be in
the respondent's reported interval, the demand curve roughly takes the shape of a step
function, with large discontinuities around the endpoints of the survey intervals.
4.4 Discussion
Overall, the results in this section suggest a precisely estimated eect of price on take-up
rates substantially greater than that found in past work. There are a number of potential
explanations for this discrepancy.
First, our sample is markedly dierent from those used in most existing papers on health
insurance decisions, which focus on the decision to take-up employer-provided insurance. As
we noted earlier, less than fteen percent of the uninsured have access to employer-provided
insurance. Furthermore, most studies use samples in which the majority of respondents are
actually covered by insurance and as insured people are far wealthier (see Table 1), we thus
focus on poorer individuals than past work has, who may exhibit dierent elasticities.
In our sample, lower-income adults are indeed more price elastic. As seen in Table 3, the
12Results are unchanged if we simply take the prediction ^ Xi, keep it if ^ Xi 2 (ai;bi) and
otherwise replace it with the endpoint of person i's interval that is closest to ^ Xi.
15richest 25 percent of people in our sample have elasticities roughly half the magnitude of the
rest of the sample, suggesting that elasticities diminish with income even in our relatively
low-income sample. Thus dierences in income could account for part of the reason we nd
much larger elasticities than do past researchers.
Second, even if respondents to our survey have the same demand function for health
insurance as do subjects in past studies, given that we are focusing on variation around
a substantially subsidized premium price, we are estimating the elasticity at a lower price
point than most papers. There is no theoretical reason to expect that insurance demand
functions exhibit a constant elasticity with respect to price, and thus no reason to expect
our elasticity estimates to be the same as those measured around a higher price point.
Third, perhaps most obviously, our methodology diers from past work, as we rely on
respondents' answers regarding hypothetical purchases. On the one hand, if people want to
sound agreeable in surveys and thus tend to say they would purchase the plan at the rst
price we oer, then elasticities would be biased toward zero. On the other hand, a heuristic
such as \always say no to the rst price but yes to the second" would likely lead to elasticities
that were upwardly biased in magnitude. This bias story is somewhat undermined by the
elasticity estimate of 0.87 (labeled in Figure 1) based on the rst price of each survey|
$4,000 in Questionnaire A and $3,000 in Questionnaire B|as respondents in both cases
have not already refused the product at a higher price. However, we certainly cannot claim
that the survey design addresses every possible criticism related to the hypothetical nature
of our subjects' valuations.
5 Policy simulations
We close the paper by using the results in the previous section to simulate the eects
of dierent subsidy and penalty schedules, focusing in particular on the Aordable Care
Act, with and without the individual mandate. We estimate enrollment eects, investigate
dierential take-up by health status, and compare the health among those predicted to take-
16up private insurance via the ACA subsidies to those who already have private insurance.
For simplicity, we generally assume that ACA coverage provisions have their full eect in
2014, the rst year they are implemented. In practice, however, the full eect might not
be realized until health insurance plans, government regulators and individuals have had a
year or two of experience with the new system.
One potential drawback of our data set is that it was collected nearly six years before
the Aordable Care Act's central coverage expansions. For several reasons, however, we
believe data from this period may be more useful in projecting take-up rates under the
ACA than data collected today.
First, the employment landscape at the time of our survey is similar to projections for
2014. The unemployment rate in August and September of 2008 was 6.1 and 6.2 percent,
respectively. The CBO projects the unemployment rate to be 6.6 percent in 2013|the year
enrollment decisions would be made|and 5.0 in 2014, the year the insurance exchanges
open for business. Collecting data today would entail extrapolating from an environment
of historically high unemployment.
Second, we collected our data more than 18 months before the passage of the ACA
(George W. Bush was still president), long before the political fervor over health reform
and \Obamacare" began. Again, one might worry that collecting data today would re-
ect respondents' passion either for or against the bill, instead of reecting their actual
willingness to pay for a specic insurance contract.
5.1 Estimating take-up rates under the Aordable Care Act
5.1.1 Enrollment without a penalty
Estimating the subsidized premium price for households under the ACA is relatively straight-
forward with the Gallup data. Using household size and yearly household income, we cal-
culate each individuals' household income relative to the poverty line.13 Beginning in 2014,
13Household size is not actually included in the Gallup survey. We impute household size by
summing the total number of children in the household (which is asked) and two for individuals
17Medicaid will cover individuals with income below 133 percent of the poverty line, so we
set their premiums equal to zero. Between 133 and 400 percent of the poverty line, we
follow the subsidy schedule established in the ACA|subsidized premium prices increase
continuously from 2.8 percent of household income for those at 133 percent of the poverty
line to 9.8 percent of income for those at 300 percent of the poverty line. The price remains
at 9.8 percent of income between 300 and 400 percent of the poverty line. As 85 percent
of individuals in our uninsured sample are below 400 percent of the poverty line, these two
provisions cover the vast majority of cases.
Above 400 percent of the poverty line, individuals do not receive subsidies. Since the
question we formulated refers to individual (as opposed to family) insurance, we assume
such individuals would face a price of $3756.96, the price of the basic Blue Cross plan
oered to federal employees in 2008. Note that this price is the total of the employee and
employer contribution and as such substantially over-states the price for anyone with an
oer of employer insurance|for example, the federal worker would only pay $1023.84 a
year for the Blue Cross plan, with his employer (the federal government) covering the rest
of the premium. Using the household component of the 2005-2006 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey, we estimate that over two-thirds of uninsured adults ages 18-64 living in
households with income over 400 percent of the poverty line have an oer of insurance
from their or their spouse's employer, and as such we believe the premium we set for such
individuals in our sample is likely too high, leading to under-estimated enrollment results.14
In our baseline estimate, we assume anyone whose estimated willingness-to-pay is above
their premium price takes-up coverage, and report these estimates in the rst row of Table
4. Col. (1) reports that 64 percent of currently uninsured individuals would gain coverage.
who report being married or living with a domestic partner and one otherwise.
14We caution that the MEPS sample has just over 150 uninsured adults above 400 percent of
the poverty line between ages 18 and 64, so our estimates on employer oering are likely noisy.
Moreover, these individuals may disproportionately work for rms that only cover a relatively
small portion of the premium, thus leading them to refuse the oer. Nevertheless, assuming that
individuals in our sample above 400 percent of the poverty line must pay both the employee and
employer side of the premium surely overstates their actual nancial contribution.
18Col. (2) translates this gure into an estimated number of covered adults. The CBO projects
that without the ACA, 51 million non-elderly individuals would be without insurance in
2014. Assuming that the adult share of that population remains at its 2009 level of 0.839, we
estimate that 0:83951 million0:643 = 28 million adults would enroll in either Medicaid
or an exchange insurance plan in 2014.15 Assuming an equal share of children would gain
coverage, we estimate that 33 million people would gain coverage via the ACA provisions
without a mandate.
Given that we estimate negative reservation prices for less than two percent of individ-
uals in our sample and that Medicaid has no premium, the calculation in the rst row of
Table 4 essentially assumes full Medicaid take-up. Given that individuals below 133 percent
of poverty will be de facto insured whether or not they ocially enroll in Medicaid, in terms
of who gains access to coverage, this assumption seems reasonable. From a scal standpoint,
even if Medicaid recipients do not enroll until they are ill, they are not \free-riding" as they
do not pay a premium regardless of when they choose to enroll.
Nevertheless, ocially enrolling in Medicaid may facilitate contact with health care
providers and thus promote preventive and primary care. And ocial estimates of insur-
ance coverage may depend on whether Medicaid eligibles actually enroll. Thus, we present
estimates assuming dierent levels of Medicaid take-up in the second and third rows of
Table 4. In the second row we assume that 85 percent of Medicaid-eligible individuals en-
roll, which lowers the total take-up rate among all uninsured adults from 64 to 62 percent.
Using the same methodology as before, this take-up translates to 26 million adults or 31
million individuals gaining coverage. In the third row we assume that only fty percent of
Medicaid-eligibles take up coverage, and the corresponding numbers are 20 and 24 million.
The fourth row of the table focuses on those individuals above 133 percent of the poverty
line and thus ineligible for Medicaid. These individuals would gain coverage via the private
insurers in the state exchanges. We estimate that without a mandate just under half of
15The 51 million gure is taken from the CBO's cost estimate of the nal version of the ACA:
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf.
19the uninsured above 133 percent of the poverty line, or roughly 12 million people, would
voluntarily enroll in an exchange plan.16
5.1.2 Enrollment with a penalty
Following the typical terminology of the debate, we refer to an \individual mandate" as
the nancial penalty individuals must pay under ACA if they do not enroll in a health
insurance plan. To assess the eect of the penalty, we add the penalty to individuals'
estimated willingness to pay. The implicit assumption is that if individuals were willing
to pay, say, $2,000 for a health insurance plan, they would be willing to pay $2,800 for a
health insurance plan and the opportunity to avoid losing $800.
The terms of the individual mandate under the Aordable Care Act are relatively
simple, and thus calculating each respondent's penalty is straightforward. The mandate is
phased in between 2014 and 2016; in 2016, individuals must pay the maximum of $695
or 2.5 percent of household income, with $695 indexed to a cost-of-living adjustment for
subsequent years. We use the CBO's ination projections to deate the $695 into 2008
dollars. The mandate exempts certain groups, including those below the federal income tax
ling threshold (in 2008, $8,025 for individuals and $16,050 for couples) and those facing
a premium greater than eight percent of household income. We thus assume non-mandate
take-up rates for these groups.
The last three columns of Table 4 present enrollment estimates assuming non-exempt
individuals without insurance would be subject to the individual mandate penalty. Overall,
we estimate that 77 percent of adults would enroll in a health plan assuming any Medicaid-
eligible individual with positive willingness-to-pay enrolls, and the share falls to 76 and 72
percent if enrollment among mandate-exempt Medicaid eligibles falls to 85 and 50 percent,
respectively. Note that in rows 2 and 3 under a mandate, we apply the Medicaid enrollment
16Note that many currently insured individuals would switch from their current plans to ex-
change plans, as only the latter qualify for subsidies, so that total enrollment in the exchanges
would be substantially higher than the estimated number of uninsured individuals who would
gain coverage via the exchanges.
20assumptions only to the exempt population (those under the ling threshold) as even many
individuals at 100 percent of the poverty line would be subject to the $695 penalty and
thus would enroll in the free program to avoid it. Using the same method as before, these
gures translate to between 37 and 39 million uninsured individuals enrolling in a health
plan.
The last row shows that the mandate substantially increases private insurance take-up.
The number of currently uninsured individuals estimated to enroll in an exchange plan
increases by nearly forty percent when a mandate is added to the ACA subsidies.
5.1.3 Discussion of enrollment estimates
The eect of the mandate depends in part on how one views Medicaid take-up. Because
more than half of those under 133 percent of the poverty level are nonetheless subject to
the mandate because they are above the ling threshold, in many of our simulations the
mandate substantially increases Medicaid take-up. If without a mandate we assume that
only half of eligibles actually enroll, then a mandate increases total enrollment by over fty
percent. If one instead takes the view that eligibility for Medicaid is equivalent to being
covered, then the mandate's eect is more limited.
Even when we assume low Medicaid take-up rates, our estimates are still greater than
those of the CBO, likely reecting the fact that our elasticity estimates are higher than
those currently in the literature upon which the CBO bases its estimates. However, in at
least one important aspect, our results may under-estimate actual take-up rates. Recall
that we asked individuals what they would be willing to pay to \get a health insurance
policy for yourself," whereas in reality the prices we imputed for individuals in Sections
and were for policies that covered the entire household.
Our projections are very similar to ndings from Massachusetts, which, as noted earlier,
saw its uninsured rate for non-elderly adults fall by 70 percent after the adoption of the 2006
reform. Massachusetts might be a lower bound for the eect of the ACA for at least three
reasons. First, as discussed earlier, the most recent data from Massachusetts likely reect
21lower take-up rates due to the recession. Second, the individual mandate in Massachusetts
does not apply to those below 150 percent of the poverty line, whereas the ACA mandate
aects many households below the poverty line.
Finally, the initially low rate of uninsurance in Massachusetts may make it harder to
substantially decrease the uninsured share if it is especially dicult to induce the last few
percent of individuals to enroll, who might be the hardest for state agencies to reach. Long
et al. (2010) use the American Community Survey to show that individuals who cannot
speak English or live in households where no adult speaks English are among the most
likely individuals to remain uninsured in Massachusetts. Similarly, other countries with
\universal" health insurance often have one or two percent uninsured (see Kwon 2009 and
Leu et al. 2009).
.
5.2 Estimating adverse selection under the Aordable Care Act
An important question is whether uninsured people with pre-existing conditions are, relative
to other uninsured individuals, more likely to enroll relative to other currently uninsured
individuals under the provisions of the Aordable Care Act. Dierential take-up rates
based on health status can generate adverse selection and unraveling of insurance markets
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). There are many questions in the Gallup data referring
to past and current health conditions, and we examine whether people who appear in
worse health are more likely to say they would purchase health insurance in our pricing
experiment.
5.2.1 Results from simulating enrollment decisions
The rst panel of Table 5 reports dierential enrollment patterns with respect to general
health variables, using enrollment estimates from the rst row of Table 4. Without a man-
date, no statistically signicant dierential selection patterns emerge for these variables. Of
the two dierences closest to being signicant at the ten-percent level|older people and
22non-smokers being more likely to join|the rst suggests those with higher medical costs
would take-up coverage and the second those with lower costs. Similar eects obtain with
a mandate, though the eect of age on the enrollment decision falls.
The next group of variables describe individual disease histories. Both with and without
a mandate, individuals with a history of high blood pressure are more likely to take-up
coverage. Without a mandate, those with a history of cancer are less likely to join whereas
those with a history of asthma are more likely.
With and without a mandate, enrollment patterns display large dierences along de-
mographic dimensions, though the results above suggest these dierences do not translate
into large cost dierences. Women and minorities are more likely to enroll, while higher-
income individuals are less likely. The income result is likely due to two eects. First,
subsidies, even on a percentage basis are more generous for poorer households. Second,
richer households are more likely to have had the opportunity to purchase health insurance
in the past but evidently chose not to. In other words, uninsured individuals who are in
higher-income households will, all else equal, have a weaker preference for health insurance.
This logic would suggest that women and minorities have had fewer past opportunities to
purchase insurance, perhaps because they disproportionately work in rms that do not oer
employer-sponsored insurance.
While Table 5 report take-up patterns for all currently uninsured respondents in the
Gallup sample, we may worry more about adverse selection in the private market, given
that individuals in Medicaid do not pay any premiums and thus cannot meaningfully \free-
ride." Appendix Table 1 replicates Table 5 after dropping all respondents under 133 percent
of the poverty line and thus eligible for Medicaid. Most of the same patterns emerge, though
fewer dierences are statistically signicant as the sample size shrinks.
5.2.2 Discussion of adverse selection results
How can our results of limited adverse selection be reconciled with past evidence of adverse
selection in the health insurance market, most notably Cutler and Reber (1998)? First,
23while Cutler and Reber nd that sicker people were more likely to choose a generous plan
when oered a menu of choices, our results concern the extensive margin of choosing to
have insurance at all. Second, our sample is poorer, with over thirty percent of respondents
below the poverty line. As the ACA subsidies are highly progressive, those with the highest
projected take-up rates have very low income levels and are most likely uninsured because
they cannot aord to pay even a modest premium, not because they were denied on the
basis of their health.
While we project minimal adverse selection under the specic ACA subsidy schedule,
we do not conclude that there is thus no benet from an individual mandate. First, recall
that we did report in Table 3 that healthier individuals are more price-sensitive. As such,
they might not choose to enroll under a less generous subsidy schedule, meaning an in-
dividual mandate could be needed to prevent adverse selection were the subsidy schedule
to change. Indeed, Chandra et al. (2011) compare pre- and post-mandate enrollment pat-
terns in Massachusetts and conclude that the mandate was essential in drawing in healthier
individuals.
Second, past work (e.g., Currie, 2004) has suggested that enrollment decisions are not
merely a function of cost and willingess-to-pay, but of salience and convenience as well,
and adverse selection could operate along the latter two margins. For example, being hos-
pitalized might act as a trigger for an individual to enroll in Medicaid or a state exchange;
not only does the experience likely make insurance more salient, but hospitals might well
have an incentive to facilitate the enrollment process on behalf of the individual so they are
reimbursed for his care. Given that contact with hospitals and other medical providers is a
function of health, this mechanism might lead sicker individuals to enroll more quickly even
if they express no greater demand for insurance. A mandate could increase the salience of
health insurance, even among those with limited contact with the health care sector, and
thus help equate take-up rates between those in good and poor health.
Finally, our own results suggest that the mandate substantially increases insurance
24coverage. This increase in coverage brings greater access to primary and preventive care,
which may have positive spillovers.
5.3 How would the ACA change the composition of the privately insured?
The analysis so far has focused on selection within the uninsured population. Now, we
compare those we predict will take up private coverage under the ACA to those who
already have private insurance. This analysis relates to whether premiums would increase
for those already covered by a private plan due to the inux of newly insured individuals
via the ACA.
The rst column of Table 6 reports summary statistics for insured respondents in the
Gallup data who are not covered via Medicaid, Medicare, or veteran's or military insur-
ance.17 The second column reports the dierence between those who would gain private
insurance without a mandate, and the privately insured respondents in the rst column.
The third column reports this same dierence when the mandate is in eect.
The \ow" of the new entrants into private plans are over 2.5 (3.6) years younger than
the \stock" of the currently enrolled without (with) a mandate. Both with and without
a mandate, there are a greater proportion of smokers in the ow than the stock, though
under a mandate those joining exercise more than current enrollees.
With respect to specic conditions and diseases, no clear pattern emerges. A history
of high blood pressure, high cholesterol or cancer appear less likely among the new en-
trants than current enrollees, whereas the reverse is true for heart attacks and asthma. We
conclude from these osetting patterns that, overall, the health of the new entrants is not
substantially dierent than the current enrollees and thus there should be little eect on
the premiums of the currently insured through this channel.
17That is, they are covered by their employer (84 percent) or \other" (16 percent).
255.4 Welfare analysis and distributional eects of the Aordable Care Act
Using our willingness-to-pay estimates, it is possible to estimate the implied consumer
surpluses resulting from the coverage provisions in the Aordable Care Act. However, these
estimates are very crude approximations of the welfare eects of the program. First, they
ignore positive externalities from any improvements in health due to increased access to
medical care. Second, they only consider the eects on the currently uninsured, whereas
many currently insured individuals will see their premiums fall due to ACA subsidies. Third,
the currently insured would also benet from the insurance value of Medicaid expansions
and exchange subsidies.
Without a mandate, we dene surplus as the dierence between willingness to pay and
the premium price for all those who do enroll, and zero for those who do not enroll. With
a mandate, consumer surplus is also equal to willingness to pay minus the premium price
for all those who enroll, but in this case surplus will be negative for all those for whom
premium   penalty < WTP < premium. For those who do not enroll, surplus is negative
and equal to the amount of the penalty.
Table 7 shows how the level and distribution of the implied consumer surplus varies
across the two regimes. The rst two columns assume there is no mandate. The average
surplus is just under $1,300, but among the 64 percent who enroll the surplus is over
$2,000. The surplus is distributed in a highly progressive manner, with the poorest half of
the sample receiving greater benets than the richer half.
The rest of the table focuses on the case with a mandate. Average surplus falls, which by
construction it must, since those who would have taken up without a mandate gain nothing
and those who would not have taken up and who are not mandate-exempt are made worse
o.18 Among those who do not enroll, surplus is bounded above by zero (for those who are
mandate-exempt) and negative for anyone who must pay the penalty. The average surplus
18Of course, this narrow construction does not speak to the desirability of the mandate more
generally.
26among this group is roughly -$400, with the loss to the richer half of households nearly
twice that to the poorer half. The last column shows that the average loss to the 35 percent
of uninsured individuals made no better o by the policy is roughly $600.
One of the largest determinants of whether an individual is made worse o by the
mandate is income. On average, those made worse o are in households with income 4.4
times the poverty line, or $98,000 for a family of four. As discussed earlier, all else equal,
having high income conditional on being uninsured suggests limited preference for health
insurance. As these individuals have limited demand but face the steepest penalties, they
have the least to gain from the policy.
6 Conclusion
We collect new data on uninsured Americans willingness-to-pay for a health insurance
plan. As this group is not usually oered health insurance by their employers (the primary
providers of health insurance in the US) they are generally excluded from observational data
used in the vast majority of past research, which focuses on employer-provided insurance.
Yet the preferences of these individuals are key to formulating a policy that could achieve
universal coverage.
Instead of relying on observational data, we present uninsured individuals with dierent
premium prices and ask whether they would pay that price to enroll in a health plan
equivalent to those oered federal employees. We nd elasticities of take-up with respect to
price around one, far larger in magnitude than those found in past work. Our results suggest
that directly subsidizing the purchase of a private health plan would signicantly shrink
the uninsured population|for example, more than 60 percent of the uninsured would take
up the plan at an annual premium of $2,000, and we estimate that 39 million individuals
would gain coverage under the specications of the ACA.
Part of the dierence between our result and those in past work is that our sample of
uninsured individuals is much poorer than the samples of people oered employer-provided
27insurance used in past papers and the rich and poor may have dierence price elasticities
(indeed, relatively richer people in our sample have lower elasticities). Moreover, as we focus
on plans to subsidize premium prices, we estimate elasticities based on variation around
a lower price point than most existing papers, which could lead to dierent estimated
elasticities even if our subjects have the same demand function as subjects in past work.
It may also be that our methodology|which has the advantages of random variation in
premium prices and a homogenous insurance product, but some of the disadvantages asso-
ciated with hypothetical-valuation studies|may also contribute to the dierence. While we
nd little evidence of one common problem with hypothetical valuation (anchoring bias),
we realize other concerns still exist. It is worth emphasizing, however, that our experi-
ment diers from contingent valuation studies in important respects. Most importantly, we
ask individuals to value a private good with which they should have some experience. By
contrast, valuation of hypothetical environmental projects is a much more alien problem.
Concerns about hypothetical valuations notwithstanding, our results suggest that extrap-
olating the eects of premium subsidies for the uninsured from the elasticities generated in
past papers could seriously under-estimate the coverage rates these policies could achieve.
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30Figure 1: Take-up rates by premium price and implied arc elasticities
Notes: Figure based on data from the Gallup Daily Poll (see text for details). Subjects were
randomly given either Questionnaire A (which oers a rst price of $4,000 and then subsequently
$3,000 and then $2,000 if subject decline at previous price) or Questionnaire B (which initially
oers a price of $3000 and then $2,000). Arc elasticities not labeled in the Figure are: -0.946
(comparing take-up at $2,000 in Questionnaire B and $4,000 in Questionnaire A), -0.769 ($2,000
from B and $3,000 from A) and -1.322 ($2,000 from A and $3,000 from B).
31Figure 2: Estimated demand curve for subsidized health plan
Notes: Estimated reservation prices are plotted on the y-axis and the share with reservation
price at or above that value on the x-axis. Reservation prices were estimated using an
interval regression of subjects' reported price intervals. See Section 4.3 for details.
32Table 1: Summary statistics by insurance status
Uninsured Insured
Obs. Mean St. dev. Obs. Mean St. dev.
Female 1213 0.461 0.499 8824 0.512 0.500
Black 1067 0.115 0.319 8352 0.122 0.328
Annual income 1000 984 35 37.79 7203 71 55.07
Employed 1213 0.640 0.480 8809 0.758 0.428
Married 1204 0.353 0.478 8794 0.584 0.493
Age 1213 38.39 12.84 8824 42.82 12.78
Previously denied insurance 1182 0.139 0.346 1163 0.0633 0.244
Body mass index 1122 27.61 6.043 8518 27.27 5.910
Days sick last month 1195 3.535 8.312 8775 2.835 7.351
Smoker 1213 0.352 0.478 8819 0.206 0.405
Days exercised last week 1197 3.156 2.649 8802 2.929 2.406
Ever diagnosed with...
High blood pressure 1208 0.185 0.388 8800 0.240 0.427
High cholesterol 1208 0.160 0.367 8789 0.232 0.422
Diabetes 1211 0.0860 0.280 8804 0.0836 0.277
Heart attack 1211 0.0317 0.175 8802 0.0285 0.166
Asthma 1211 0.134 0.341 8808 0.118 0.323
Cancer 1209 0.0312 0.174 8806 0.0483 0.214
Notes: All data from the Gallup daily poll of adults 18 and over from August 22 to September
8, 2008. We exclude individuals 65 and older, the vast majority of whom would be covered by
Medicare. Sample weights provided by Gallup are used. For those with insurance, the question
on previous denials of insurance was only asked the rst two days of the survey.
33Table 2: Estimating insurance take-up as a function of premium price
Dependent Variable: Would purchase health plan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price -0.152 -0.167 -0.173 -0.182 -0.164











Log of income 0.0318 0.0341
[0.00570] [0.0117]
Randomized to 0.0159 0.0144
Questionnaire A [0.0217] [0.0363]
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS Probit OLS, x. e.
Sample All No missing No missing No missing All
controls controls controls
Observations 2,975 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,975
Notes: See Table 1 for information on data and sampling. Each observation is a person-price,
where price takes on values of f$2;000;$3;000;$4;000g if the respondent received questionnaire
A or f$2;000;$3;000g if the respondent received questionnaire B. All regressions are weighted
by sample weights provided by Gallup, though sample weights are multiplied by 2
3 for those in
Questionnaire A so that they do not make a larger contribution to the estimate merely because
they have three price points, though results are unchanged if the original Gallup sample weights
are used.




Over age fty -0.911 956
Married -0.992 1071
Top income quartile -0.757 138
Bottom three quartiles -1.107 2311
Employed -1.072 1945
Obese (BMI greater than 30) -1.014 745
Smoker -1.258 1002
Has a health problem -0.954 673
Previously denied insurance -0.867 451
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2. Elasticities are based on the xed-eects regression in col. (5) of Table
2, estimated separately for each subsample. \Top income quartile" is based on being above the
75th percentile in household income in our data ($54,000) and \has a health problem" is dened as
answering \yes" to the question: \Do you have any health problems that prevent you from doing
any of the things people your age normally do?" Observations are counted at the person-price
level.
35Table 4: Enrollment estimates under the Aordable Care Act under various assumptions
regarding Medicaid enrollment
Without \mandate" With \mandate"
Number (millions) Number (millions)
Medicaid assumption Take-up rate Adults Total Take-up rate Adults Total
Enroll if WTP > 0 0.643 27.5 32.8 0.770 33.0 39.3
85% take up 0.615 26.3 31.4 0.763 32.7 38.9
50% take up 0.477 20.4 24.3 0.722 30.9 36.8
Excl. Medicaid eligibles 0.463 10.3 12.3 0.639 14.3 17.0
Total obs. 816
{Ex. Medicaid 535
Notes: Estimates based on willingess-to-pay results estimated from the Gallup data in Section
4.3. As subsidies are based on an individual's income, we can only estimate the eect of ACA
provisions on the 816 observations for whom we have both a willingness-to-pay estimate and a
valid response to the household income question. The rst row assumes any enrollee for whom
WTP > premium   penalty will take-up coverage, and thus assumes that any Medicaid-eligible
individual with positive WTP will enroll, as premiums are equal to zero for this group. The second
and third column treat Medicaid eligibles dierently, assuming that, respectively, only 85 and 50
percent will enroll. The second and fth columns merely multiply the rst column and fourth
column, respectively, by the CBO's estimate of the total number of uninsured in 2014 without the
ACA (51 million) and the adult share of the uninsured in 2009 (.839). The estimated totals in the
third and sixth column merely scale the numbers in, respectively, the rst and fourth column by
the entire 51 million and thus assume that children have the same take-up rates as adults. The
fourth row replicates the rst row, but only for the 535 observations with valid willingness-to-pay
and income measure who are also above 133 percent of the poverty line and thus ineligible for
Medicaid.
36Table 5: Characteristics of those predicted to take up coverage or remain uncovered under
ACA
Without mandate With mandate
Covered Uncov. Di. Covered Uncov. Di.
General health variables
Has a health problem 0.25 0.20 0.047 0.24 0.21 0.032
Body mass index 28.1 27.2 0.93 28.0 27.2 0.78
Days sick last month 3.99 3.45 0.53 4.02 3.04 0.98
Smoker 0.37 0.44 -0.072 0.38 0.45 -0.077
Days exercised last week 3.12 3.37 -0.25 3.14 3.44 -0.30
Previously denied insurance 0.15 0.11 0.044 0.14 0.12 0.020
Age 40.1 37.6 2.58 39.4 38.6 0.81
Ever diagnosed with...
High blood pressure 0.23 0.16 0.079** 0.23 0.13 0.10**
High cholesterol 0.18 0.14 0.045 0.17 0.15 0.024
Cancer 0.027 0.056 -0.029** 0.033 0.051 -0.018
Heart attack 0.048 0.024 0.024 0.044 0.024 0.021
Diabetes 0.094 0.076 0.018 0.097 0.058 0.039
Asthma 0.16 0.081 0.078** 0.13 0.12 0.015
Demographic variables
Female 0.48 0.38 0.096** 0.47 0.37 0.091*
Black 0.14 0.055 0.085** 0.12 0.060 0.064**
Hispanic 0.12 0.053 0.071** 0.11 0.059 0.051
Annual income 1000 30.3 52.2 -21.9** 36.6 43.2 -6.59
Employed 0.64 0.80 -0.16** 0.66 0.81 -0.14**
Married 0.37 0.32 0.051 0.35 0.35 -0.00084
Share enrolling 0.64 0.77
Notes: The sample in this table are all 816 Gallup respondents who report being currently unin-
sured and have both an estimated willingness-to-pay value from Section 4.3 and non-missing
household income information. \Covered" refers those who are predicted to take-up either Medi-
caid or exchange coverage under ACA, and \Uncovered" refers to the rest of the currently unin-
sured. We assume an individual will take-up coverage whenever WTP > premium   penalty, so
these estimates correspond to the rst row of Table 4. p < 0:1p < 0:05
37Table 6: Comparing those gaining private coverage under ACA to current private enrollees
Dierence: New versus current enrollees
Current enrollees No mandate Mandate
General health variables
Age 42.9 -2.57** -3.64**
Has a health problem 0.13 0.030 0.039**
Body mass index 27.1 0.47 0.40
Days sick last month 1.83 0.51 0.87**
Smoker 0.18 0.13** 0.15**
Days exercised last week 2.92 0.18 0.27**
Previously denied insurance 0.061 0.087** 0.073**
Ever diagnosed with...
High blood pressure 0.22 -0.045* -0.025
High cholesterol 0.22 -0.081** -0.087**
Cancer 0.044 -0.016 -0.017*
Heart attack 0.019 0.016** 0.015**
Diabetes 0.068 -0.0055 0.013
Asthma 0.10 0.037** 0.0017
Observations 7726 264 354
Notes: The rst column includes all those in the Gallup survey who report having health insurance,
but excludes those who are on Medicaid or Medicare or on veteran's or military insurance (leaving
employer and \other" as the source of insurance). The second column reports the dierence
between: 1) all the uninsured in the Gallup survey who are predicted to take up coverage under
ACA without a mandate but who are over 133 percent of the poverty line and thus ineligible for
Medicaid; and 2) the individuals in the rst column. The third column is identical to the second
but assumes the ACA mandate is in place. p < 0:1p < 0:05
38Table 7: Estimates of consumer surplus under the Aordable Care Act
With mandate
Without mandate Enrolled/Mcaid Surplus > 0
All Enrolled/Mcaid All Yes No Yes No
Average surplus 1291 2007 1085 1526 -396 2007 -580
Avg., low income 1633 2180 1555 1897 -279 2180 -311
Avg., high income 637 1445 184 579 -491 1445 -810
Share of total 0.643 0.770 0.230 0.643 0.357
Notes: Consumer surplus is equal to willingess to pay minus premium price for all those who
enroll in a plan. Enrollment is assumed whenever WTP > premium penalty, as in the rst row
of Table 4. For those who do not enroll, consumer surplus is set to zero under the no-mandate
assumption. Under a mandate, it remains at zero for those who are mandate-exempt, and equal
to  penalty for those not exempt. \High" and \low income" refer, respectively, to those above
and below the sample's median income of .
39Appendix Table 1: Characteristics of those predicted to take up coverage or remain uncov-
ered under ACA, excluding Medicaid eligibles
Without mandate With mandate
Covered Uncov. Di. Covered Uncov. Di.
General health variables
Has a health problem 0.16 0.19 -0.032 0.17 0.19 -0.023
Body mass index 27.6 27.4 0.20 27.5 27.4 0.12
Days sick last month 2.34 3.17 -0.82 2.70 2.94 -0.23
Smoker 0.31 0.42 -0.11** 0.33 0.44 -0.10*
Days exercised last week 3.10 3.47 -0.37 3.19 3.49 -0.30
Previously denied insurance 0.15 0.11 0.036 0.13 0.12 0.016
Age 40.3 37.9 2.44 39.3 38.6 0.67
Ever diagnosed with...
High blood pressure 0.17 0.15 0.020 0.19 0.11 0.084**
High cholesterol 0.14 0.13 0.0095 0.13 0.13 -0.0029
Cancer 0.029 0.033 -0.0046 0.028 0.037 -0.0099
Heart attack 0.035 0.027 0.0085 0.034 0.025 0.0090
Diabetes 0.063 0.083 -0.020 0.081 0.061 0.020
Asthma 0.14 0.073 0.066** 0.10 0.10 0.00095
Demographic variables
Female 0.42 0.35 0.070 0.39 0.37 0.027
Black 0.12 0.060 0.061* 0.10 0.063 0.040
Hispanic 0.092 0.050 0.042 0.074 0.062 0.012
Annual income 1000 52.9 55.9 -2.97 59.9 45.1 14.8**
Employed 0.77 0.80 -0.026 0.77 0.81 -0.038
Married 0.34 0.32 0.025 0.31 0.36 -0.052
Share enrolling 0.46 0.64
Notes: See Table 5. The sample in this table are all 535 Gallup respondents who report being
currently uninsured, have both an estimated willingness-to-pay value from Section 4.3 and non-
missing household income information, and are at at least 133 percent of the poverty line and
thus ineligible for Medicaid.
40Survey questions
Questionnaire A
 If you could get a health insurance policy for yourself that is as good as the one that
members of Congress have, given your current nancial situation, would you buy it
for $4,000 a year, which works out to $333 per month?
 If you could get that health insurance plan for $3,000 a year, which works out to $250
per month, would you buy it?
 If you could get that health insurance plan for $2,000 a year, which works out to $167
per month, would you buy it?
Questionnaire B
 If you could get a health insurance policy for yourself that is as good as the one that
members of Congress have, given your current nancial situation, would you buy it
for $3,000 a year, which works out to $250 per month?
 If you could get that health insurance plan for $2,000 a year, which works out to $167
per month, would you buy it?
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